There is a growing consensus that the long-run per capita growth rate of the U.S. economy has drifted lower since the early 2000s, consistent with a perceived slowdown in business dynamism. One factor that may have contributed to this is a downshift in venture capital investment and its failure to recover in line with stock prices, as pre-2003 patterns would suggest. Critics have argued that this is associated with the increased regulatory burden for publically traded firms to comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). There is inconclusive evidence of SOX deterring firms from becoming publically traded as indicated by IPO activity, a proxy reflecting several factors that may not be as tied to innovation as venture capital. Earlier tests of SOX's impact on venture capital activity, which tended to focus on cross-sectional evidence, were hampered by a short time-series sample following the Internet-stock bust of the early 2000s. Taking advantage of the large-sized rise, fall, and recovery in stock prices since then, this study assesses whether the time-series behavior of venture capital investment shifted following SOX. We find evidence of a time-series break in the middle of our sample, consistent with the passage of SOX. Estimates indicate that the slower post-SOX pace of venture capital investment is mainly attributed to a reduced elasticity of such investment with respect to stock prices rather than to a simple downshift in the level of investment. Our estimates suggest that a cost-benefit analysis of SOX could be worthwhile, especially given concerns that the long-run growth rate of U.S. productivity and GDP has been unusually sluggish and the emerging consensus that excessive debt financing-not equity financing-is more tied to the subset of financial crises associated with severe macroeconomic downturns.
Introduction
There is growing concern that the long-run growth rate of the U.S. economy has slowed so far this century-even apart from slower workforce growth-perhaps reflecting an end to large technical revolutions (e.g., Gordon, 2012) , a lesser pace of innovation (Cette, et al., 2015) , slower capital formation, and declining business creation (e.g., Decker, et al. 2016a) . 1 In the past and even predating the high-tech boom of the late-1990s, high rates of entry have been positively correlated with rates of innovation (Acs and Audretsch, 1990 , and Geroski, 1989 , 1995 .
Diminished business creation (or dynamism) since 2000 has been concentrated in high-tech industries that has coincided with a measured slowdown in innovation in this sector. Likely compounding the impact of reduced entry rates on innovation and economic growth is the marked decrease in the share of new firms that have subsequently grown rapidly (Decker, et al. 2016b ).
These patterns are consistent with the critical role that the high-tech industry played in the productivity mini-boom of the late 1990s (Oliner, et al., 2007) , which has since ebbed.
Coincident with the post-2000 slowdown in tech firm creation has been a marked downshift in the range in which venture capital investment has fluctuated ( Figure 1 ). In particular, venture capital investment has failed to recover in line with stock prices (a signal of potential returns) as much as pre-2003 patterns would suggest, as illustrated in Figure 2 . It plots total venture capital investment and the Nasdaq, both scaled by GDP. Some (Zhang, 2007) of compliance outweigh its benefits (Iliev, 2010) . 2 While 2007 reforms, which lowered compliance costs for smaller firms, arguably removed this factor, venture investment is substantially driven by the returns of rapidly growing companies that one day would need to fully comply with SOX. By raising compliance costs, thereby reducing the potential value of a start-up becoming a publicly owned company, SOX has arguably lowered capitalists' valuations of startups and expanding young firms. This, in turn, has had the unintended consequence of inducing lower venture capital investment in such firms (see Fletcher and Miles, 2004, p. 74) . Indeed, rapidly growing small firms have been notably scarce since 2000, as Decker, et al. (2016b) have found, which could be related to the downshift in venture capital investment since many leading public companies received funding from venture capital early in their development (see Gornall and Strebulaev, 2015) . That said, there is inconclusive evidence of whether SOX has deterred firms from becoming publicly traded as evidenced by IPO activity (e.g., see Engel, et al., 2007 , 2007 , and Gao, et al., 2013 . However, initial public offerings reflect several factors and may not be as tied to innovation as venture capital. Earlier tests of SOX's impact on venture capital were hampered by a short time-series sample-the period following the Internet-stock bust of the early 2000s-and tended to focus on cross-sectional evidence.
Taking advantage of the large-sized rise of stock prices in the mid-2000s, their fall during the Great Recession, and full recovery since then, this study assesses whether the time-series behavior of venture capital investment shifted following SOX's passage. We find statistically significant evidence of a time-series break near the passage of SOX, consistent with the argument that regulation created by SOX has deterred venture capital investment. Estimates indicate that the slower post-SOX pace of venture capital investment is mainly attributed to a reduced elasticity of such investment with respect to stock prices rather than to a simple downshift in the level of investment. These findings relate to two broad concerns regarding growth and financial stability;
namely, that long-run growth has downshifted to an undesirably slow pace in the U.S. and that equity financing poses less risk to financial stability than debt financing.
3 To establish our empirical results, the next section briefly outlines the role played by stock prices as a factor affecting venture capital investment and the data used. Section 3 presents the empirical findings, while Section 4 concludes.
Stock prices as an incentive to undertake venture capital investment
There are several important roles that venture capitalists play, key among them are supplying needed managerial talent to supplement scientific or technical expertise in developing products and overcoming asymmetric information problems in research and development when firms have intangible capital and a need for external finance (Gompers and Lerner, 2004, inter alia) . Venture capitalists do so in several ways, particularly through monitoring equity investors as firm directors, requiring key employees and other stakeholders to have some state-contingent payouts, and providing new investment in stages (Gompers and Lerner, 1999) . Venture capitalists' main payoff comes from selling their formerly illiquid investment stakes, usually after initial public offerings, to paraphrase Gompers and Lerner (1999) . If stock prices are roughly a random walk owing to difficulties in out-forecasting fundamentals or discount rates, then stock prices provide a signal of the prospective returns from venture capital investments. By implication, swings in stock prices are likely positively correlated with swings in the equilibrium level of 3 There is evidence that the downshift in long-run total factor productivity (TFP) growth predated the Great Recession, and was concentrated in IT industries (see Fernald 2015) . This timing downplays the role of the Great Recession in the productivity slowdown, and is consistent with the plausible role of venture capital investment, which slowed down a few years before the deceleration in TFP growth and which historically had been an important source of equity funding for IT firms (see Gornall and Strebulaev, 2015) .
venture capital investment, ceteris paribas. This is consistent with the empirical cross-section results of Miloud, et al. (2012) , who examine the determinants of venture capitalist valuations of firms ("pre-money" or prior to a subsequent IPO), which critically affect the volume of venture capital investment. In particular, Miloud, et al. (2012) find that venture capitalist valuations of firms in which they invest are significantly affected by stock prices, controlling for a myriad of other factors (e.g., firm-specific and industry-specific influences).
The venture capital industry initially was slow to develop, partly because the nature of its investments required long-run patient investors (e.g., funding from institutional investors) and sufficient R&D related investment outside of large firms. It received some inducement in 1979
when Congress reformed pension laws (ERISA, 1979) to clarify implicit "Prudent Man Rule" restrictions on corporate pension funds and explicitly permit the funds to invest up to 10 percent of their capital in venture capital funds (Gompers, 2004 
Empirical approach to testing for long-run and short-run relationships
To test these two implications, an error-correction framework is used to estimate long-run (equilibrium) and short-run movements in venture capital investment. This approach is suited to our purposes for at least two reasons. First, it can model nonstationary variables as a function of one another, provided that the variables are cointegrated-that is the deviation between actual and equilibrium levels are themselves stationary. Second, the error-correction approach explicitly allows the time for stock price signals to affect venture capital investment. If this approach works well for modeling venture capital, the estimated equilibrium level of investment will move slightly ahead of the actual level, with a statistically significant tendency for short-run changes to narrow (correct) the gap between the actual and equilibrium levels, proxied by the prior period's gap (or error). Thus, one can use cointegration tests to see if long-run relationships are valid and estimate short-run models to see if there is evidence of correction toward the long-run equilibrium in the short-run.
Our main variables are nonstationary and are integrated of order 1, meaning that they have trends that can complicate statistical analysis and that the first differences of these variables are stationary (Table 1) . We use the Johansen-Juselius approach rather than the DOLS approach to estimate the long-run relationships, as the latter's use of future changes in variables seems implausible given that expectations of making venture capital investments in the future would move overall stock price indexes in advance and to a substantial degree.
Cointegration analysis is amenable to testing whether right-hand side variables are exogenous to the dependent variable, providing evidence on whether stock prices drive venture capital investment or the reverse. We use vector-error correction models (VECMs) to jointly estimate the long-run relationship between two variables, Y1 and Y2, in a cointegrating vector and short-run effects in first difference equations, respectively:
where the lags of first difference endogenous variables minimize the AIC, X is a vector of exogenous factors, εit are residuals, and the λi, γi, and δi v are row vectors of coefficients.
Each of our specifications include the level of venture capital investment, either total (VCTot) or tech related (VCTech), and the NASDAQ stock price index (Nasdaq). 5 These enter as logs, and are detrended either by business equipment and intellectual property investment or GDP, denoted by superscripts inv and GDP, respectively. The detrending should clean-up any breaks in the cointegrating relationship driven by long-term demographic or productivity growth trends.
Detrending by scaling with business investment additionally limits the influence of cycles in investment that may differ from movements in GDP, especially during periods of high unused capacity, such as the Great Recession and the subsequent recovery from it. The Gregory-Hansen (1996) test for cointegration allows for an unknown break in the constant and slope in the cointegrating relationship. These tests, shown in Table 5 , provide statistically significant evidence of a cointegrating relationship. The breakpoint identified by the procedure is typically in 2002, consistent with the timing of the passing of SOX. However the Gregory-Hansen test assumes a breakpoint and then tests for cointegration; it is not intended to be a test for the existence of a breakpoint or the timing of a breakpoint.
Tests of a break in the long-run relationship between venture capital investment and stock prices
The graphical tests of Hansen and Johansen (1999) are more appropriate for assessing the stability of cointegrating relationships and identifying any potential breakpoints. Table 7 . This test is similar to the Bai and Perron (2003) In contrast, when SOX is allowed to affect the responsiveness of venture capital investment to stock prices as well as having a non-interactive effect, a unique, significant cointegrating vector is found in every case for Model 3 in Tables 2-4 . And in each instance, the non-interactive scaled stock variable (lnNasdaq) is positive and statistically significant, while the variable interacting SOXShift with stock prices is negative and statistically significant. In each case, the absolute magnitude of the positive coefficient on non-interacted stock prices is larger than the absolute size of the negative coefficient on the SOX-interacted stock price variable, with the sum of the coefficients statistically significant. This pattern implies that stock prices still have a positive effect on venture capital investment post-SOX, but that venture capital investment has become less responsive to stock prices post-SOX.
The non-interactive SOXShift variable is significant in every version of Model 3 in Tables   2-4 . In each case, the sign is positive, which may seem counter-intuitive at first glance. However, the net effect of SOX in the Model 3 specification combines the non-interactive effect of SOXShift and its interactive effect on the responsiveness of stock prices. And the net effect in every case is negative. This is illustrated in Figure 4 , which plots the actual tech-related venture capital investment with the estimated equilibrium level from Model 3 in Table 2 In each table, the coefficient on lnNasdaq is similar in Model 3 to that in Model 4, which omits the SOX variables but is estimated over a pre-SOX sample. Because of this, the equilibrium path of venture capital based on pre-SOX relationships from Model 4 are virtually identical to the counterfactual equilibrium levels from Model 3 plotted in Figure 4 . Thus, Models 3 and 4 in each table imply that venture capital investment has been lower post-SOX than scaled stock prices would suggest based on pre-SOX relationships.
Estimates of short-run relationships between venture capital investment and stock prices
The lower panels of Tables 2-4 investment tend to be negative when the actual log-level of venture capital investment exceeds its estimated equilibrium log-level. It is also encouraging that the size of the error-correction coefficient in the preferred Model 3 specification implies that venture capital investment changes in quarter t to close 40 to 42 percent of the gap between actual and equilibrium venture capital investment in the prior quarter.
Tests of weak exogeneity
The results also provided evidence on the direction of long-run feedback between stock prices and venture capital investment. Each model was estimated as a vector error-correction model that contained separate equations for changes in venture capital investment, stock prices, SOXShift, and SOXShift interacted with stock prices. These equations were regressed on the same error-correction term, the same lags of changes in the long-run variables, and the same sets of short-run variables. If the error-correction term is significant in the model of venture capital investment but is insignificant in the model of stock prices, then formal econometric evidence would indicate that stock prices are 'weakly exogenous' to venture capital investment, as discussed in Urbain (1992) , and that venture capital investment is temporally "caused," in a long-run sense, by the stock prices, according to Granger and Lin (1995) . In every case for Model 3, the noninteractive and stock price-interacted SOX variables are weakly exogenous to venture capital (not reported), while venture capital investment is not weakly exogenous to those variables, as implied by the significant error-correction coefficients reported in Tables 2-4.
As reported in Table 6 , while venture capital investment is not weakly exogenous to noninteracted stock prices and the other variables, the latter are weakly exogenous to venture capital in two of three cases: tech-related venture capital scaled by GDP and total venture capital scaled by business investment. For tech-related venture capital investment scaled by business investment, there is some evidence that venture capital investment may have some feedback on stock prices. Nevertheless, the t-statistic on the error-correction term for venture capital (4.12) is notably higher and more significant than the t-statistic on the error-correction term for non-interactive stock prices (2.19). This suggests that there is more feedback from stock prices to venture capital investment than the reverse, as intuition would suggest. In addition, note that the test for whether noninteracted stock prices are exogenous to all the other variables, includes stock prices interacted with the SOX shift variable. Consistent with this point, the error-correction terms on stock prices and stock prices interacted with the SOXShift variable are jointly insignificant in this case, implying that over the full sample, on net, stock prices are weakly exogenous to venture capital.
Conclusion
Venture capital investment has not recovered to levels seen in the late 1990s, despite a recovery in stock prices to around then-prevailing levels. This study provides statistical timeseries evidence of diminished responsiveness of venture capital investment to stock prices following the introduction of SOX legislation in early 2002. This is consistent with the view that the regulatory burdens associated with SOX and perhaps higher levels of overall regulation since then have deterred investment, including venture capital investment, in research and development.
It is important to note that movements in venture capital investment do not always coincide with swings in overall IPO activity, reflecting that the latter includes non-venture capital related activity motivated by other factors.
From a broader perspective, the findings are related to the emerging literature on the financial stability need to regulate debt and the shadow banking industry. There is an emerging consensus of an imperative to regulate shadow banking-funded debt, owing to the negative externalities posed by debt financing (see Duca, et al., forthcoming, and Turner, 2015) and the regulatory arbitrage induced by unequal treatment of banks and nonbank debt providers that has fueled the rise of shadow banking (Duca, 2016) and played a role in fueling the U.S. subprime housing boom and bust . Other studies also find that only a subset of financial crises are linked to severe macroeconomic distress, namely those associated with excessive investment in real estate (Bordo and Haubrich, 2017) , which are often funded with excessive reliance on debt (see inter alia, Jorda, Schularik, and Taylor, 2015 and Turner, 2015) . Debt-funded booms are problematic partly because of the correlated macroeconomic downside risks to which they can lead during busts when borrower purchases are constrained by debt overhangs and when financial intermediaries' ability to lend is impaired by loan losses (see Duca and Muellbauer, 2014;  inter alia). However, there is less evidence of negative externalities posed by excessive equity financing, owing in part to incentives arising from asymmetric information and the repricing features of equity relative to debt financing. 6 These concerns raise issues for calculating the benefits of regulating equity markets.
With respect to the costs from equity regulation, one potential downside appears to be that SOX has possibly curtailed venture capital investment, consistent with this study's estimates that tech-related venture investment is 40 percent below what pre-SOX relationships would imply.
This amounts to about 0.4 percentage points of total business equipment plus intellectual property investment and may help account for why there has been a notable decline in the share of new businesses that have grown rapidly, as documented by Decker, et al. (2016b) . These patterns coupled with the downshift in U.S. productivity growth since the mid-2000s suggest that greater equity regulation entails some downside risk to long-run growth. To some extent regulatoryinduced declines in venture capital investment may have also induced a greater share of firms to remain privately held. Although the latter type of firms do not have as much access to broad capital sources as publicly traded firms, this substitution towards privately-held companies could limit the net macroeconomic effects of weaker venture capital investment. Clearly, a welfare analysis is beyond the scope of this paper and would need to account for such substitution effects in assessing the cost of regulation, versus its benefits from limiting fraud and other deleterious behavior. With this caveat in mind, our findings suggest that a review of the costs and benefits of SOX could be worthwhile. (Quarterly data, 1995q1-2016q4, Sample estimation period 1995 :q3 -2016 Notes: first differences of lagged variables omitted in the short-run results section to conserve space (full results are available). "v." denotes vector, while +, * and ** denote 90%, 95%, and 99% significance levels, respectively. Absolute t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance indicators for a unique cointegrating vector refer to trace then max-eigen statistics. The AIC selected a lag length of one quarter for each model. The significance level of VECLM statistics accounts for size of the vector. 
